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SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE AND
JURY-CONTROL DEVICES AVAILABLE
BEFORE VERDICTt
Fleming James, Jr.*O VER the years, the courts have developed numerous devices for
controlling the jury in the exercise of its traditional functions.
This article will discuss several of the most important of these devices:
first the concept of sufficiency of the evidence and then the closely
related mechanisms available during the trial for implementing this
concept.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
The concept of sufficiency of the evidence is addressed to the court's
function, not the jury's. The court will not submit a case to the jury
unless it decides as an initial matter that the proponent has proven each
of the propositions essential to his claim by sufficient evidence to
justify or warrant a finding in his favor upon it. This requirement is
obviously a corollary of the modern notion that juries must decide cases
on the evidence put before them in court and may no longer rely on
private knowledge unknown to the judge.1
The clearest case of insufficient evidence is presented where the
proponent offers literally no evidence at all upon a proposition essential
to his claim. But unless the requirement is to be a mockery it must go
further than this; surely it should not be satisfied by calling a witness to
testify simply that he saw the defendant in a negligence case at the
scene of the accident, although such testimony might well have enough
relevance to the issue to merit admissibility in evidence. It is a judicial
t This article will appear as part of a forthcoming text on procedure by Professor
James, to be published by Little, Brown & Co. The author gratefully acknowledges
the able assistance rendered by Stephen L. Dinces, third year student, Yale Law School.
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School. B.A., 1925, LL.B., 1928, Yale University.
Member, Connecticut Bar.
1. See 9 WIGMORE, EvmENcE §§ 2487, 2494 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as
WIGMORE]. Much of what appears in the first part of this article parallels a former
article wherein the author sought to treat some of the same problems in a different
context. See James, Proof of the Breach in Negligence Cases (Including Res lpsa
iLoq Uituir), 37 VA. L.,Rv. 179 (1951).
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legend that there once was a "scintilla rule" under which a verdict
could be directed only when there was literally no evidence for pro-
ponent,2 but if there ever was such a notion all that remains of it today
is its universal repudiation. 3
Before attempting to analyze the requirement of sufficiency of
evidence, it will be well to give a very brief description of the kinds
of evidence. In the final analysis all proof requires some process of
inference, before it can be translated into an actual decision by the
trier. We are accustomed, however, to divide proof into direct and
circumstantial. When evidence of a fact is in the form of testimony. by
a purported observer of that fact, we call the evidence direct, as to that
fact. And where that fact in turn is one of the propositions which a
party is trying to establish as his side of an ultimate issue made by the
pleadings in the case, or in any other way permitted by the relevant
procedural rules, then the evidence is direct evidence in that case. 4
The only processes of inference involved have to do with the credibility
(including accuracy of observation, memory, et cetera) of the witness
and the accuracy of his means of communication. Where the thing
itself, which is one of the facts in issue (such at the torn carpet that
caused the accident, or the injured limb), is put before the trier for
actual inspection we call the evidence "real evidence." 5 In all other
cases proof is called circumstantial and will be seen to require further
processes of inference. Typically it involves proof of fact A, which
is not itself a fact in issue, as the basis of an inference of the existence
of fact B, which is in issue. A word should also be said about what is
called "demeanor evidence." This refers to what the trier may actually
observe about the witnesses in the way of appearance, conduct, manner,
and so on." It may have great bearing on questions of credibility but
affects the question of sufficiency at only two points as we shall see.
2. See 9 X Vo E 2494, at 296 n.i 1:
This phrase is mentioned, to be repudiated, in the 1800s: 1857, Toomey v. R.
Co.. 3 C.B. N.S. 146. 150; 1857, Wheelton v. Hardisty, 8 E. & B. 232, 262, 277;
1868, Ryder v. Wombell, L.R. 4 Exch. 32; but it is difficult to find any prior time
when it was ever a recognized test in England.
3. See cases collected Drc. DIG. Trial, Key No. 139(1) (i); 9 AVIdIORr § 2494 n.12;
Smith. The Power of the Judge To Direct a Verdict: Section 457-a of the New
York Civil Practice Act, 24 COLum. L. REv. 111, 114 (1924).
4. 1 WIGNIORE § 24.
5. Ibid. Another term is demonstrative evidence. See DEC. DIG., ELidence, Key
Nos. 188-98.
6. See L. Hand, J., in Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1952); 3
AVIA;MoRF § 946.
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Where there is direct testimony of the existence of a simple fact
(i.e., in the sense of someone's conduct or an item in the circumstances
surrounding it),7 such testimony is generally held in civil cases to satisfy
the test of sufficiency-it will, as we say, justify or warrant a finding
by the trier that the fact existed. The concept of sufficiency is not
concerned with the question of whether the trier will in fact make such a
finding; it has nothing to do with ordinary questions of credibility or the
persuasive effect which evidence will actually have upon the mind of this
particular jury or judge as trier of fact. It does not ordinarily matter
therefore that the testimony of the fact may be contradicted or im-
peached."
The statements in the last paragraph are subject to two qualifications.
In the first place, courts do place outer bounds on credibility, and
testimony which is ruled incredible as a matter of law will not be
counted in determining sufficiency. If, for example, a witness' testimony
is flatly contradicted by indisputable physical facts or laws of nature,
it will be disregarded as not capable of belief by reasonable men.9
Courts have it in their power to extend the notion of incredibility as
a matter of law so as to contract the jury's function substantially. In
fact, however, they have used this doctrine sparingly, and while it will
be extended to an occasional extreme set of circumstances beyond the
physical facts situation, the latter situation accounts for most of the
occasions for its use. As one appellate court put it, perhaps over-
dramatically: "This court and the trial court must ordinarily accept as
7. Thayer defines the word fact-in the ordinary lay sense-"as indicating things,
events, actions, conditions, as happening, existing, really taking place.' THAYER, A PaE-
LIMINARY TtaxrlsB oN EviDENcE AT =H COMMON LAW 191 (1898) [hereinafter cited
as THAYER].
8. See Taylor v. Corkey, 142 Conn. 150, 111 A.2d 925 (1955); Twohey v. Brown,
246 Iowa 114, 66 N.W.2d 870 (1954); Alvey v. Butchkavitz, 196 Va. 447, 84 S.E.2d
535 (1954); Olney v. Carmichael, 202 Md. 226, 96 A.2d 37 (1953); Rueger v. Hawks,
150 Neb. 834, 36 N.W.2d 236 (1949); Kircher v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 32 Cal.
2d 176, 195 P.2d 427 (1948).
If the testimony of one witness .. . is legally sufficient, it matters not that this
testimony may be contradicted by ten witnesses for defendant, or even that
it may be in conflict with statements before the trial, or testimony in a previous
trial or other legal proceeding, of the same witness.
Olney v. Carmichael, supra at 232, 96 A.2d at 39.
9. See, e.g., Baltimore & O.R.R. v. State ex rel. Andrews, 190 Md. 227, 58 A.2d 243
(1948); Scott v. Hansen, 228 Iowa 37, 289 N.W. 710 (1940); Gianota v. New York,
N.H. & H.R.R., 98 Conn. 743, 120 Atl. 560 (1923); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Chambers,
165 Ky. 703, 178 S.W. 1041 (1915).
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true the testimony even of a veritable Munchausen in the uttermost
stretches of his imaginings." "0
Direct testimony of a fact's existence may occasionally be regarded
as insufficient to warrant a finding of that fact for another reason. In
a few instances our law imposes an artificial requirement of corrobora-
tion, as in the case of treason" or perjury.' 2 Such rules were once fairly
common throughout our law, but today have almost disappeared from
civil cases. A possible exception is found in cases where a passenger is
injured by the jerk or jolt of a train or other conveyance. Some courts,
for instance, hold that the severity of the jolt needed to show negligence
is not sufficiently proven by testimony which simply describes the jolt
as severe by appropriate adjectives; there must be corroboration, as by
showing its effect on other passengers.'3
The question of sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove a
fact is more complex and subtle. It turns on the concept of legitimacy
of the desired inference. If A is shown, then the trier may infer B
from A if, but only if, the inference is a rational one.' The test of
rationality is usually expressed in terms of probabilities. Where from
10. Kuper v. Betzer, 115 F.2d 842, 844 (8th Cir. 1940); see Kircher v. Atchison, T. &
S.F. Ry., 32 Cal. 2d 176, 195 P.2d 427 (1948); Lutzen v. Henry Jenkins Transp. Co.,
133 Conn. 669, 54 A.2d 267 (1947). In the Kircher case a dissenting judge, at 188, 195
P.2d at 435, characterized the situation thus:
To be expected to believe that the plaintiff could have stumbled over a shallow
depression thirteen feet from the westerly rail of the track and been pitched
forward and under the train on that track so that his hand was crushed on the
easterly rail and his body not injured while under the moving train, taxes
credulity to the breaking point.
In the Lutzen case the court held erroneous an instruction that plaintiff would be
negligent as a matter of law if she walked into the side of a moving truck in broad
daylight.
11. US. CoNsT. art. III, 3; see Haupt v. United. States, 330 U.S. 631 (1947).
Wigmore calls such requirements synthetic or quantitative rules. 7 WIoMORE S 2030.
See generally 7 WIGMORZ SS 2030-75.
12. See Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606 (1945); Annot, 156 A.L.R. 499 (1945);
Annot, 1II A.L.R. 825 (1937).
13. See Seidenberg v. Eastern Mass. St. Ry., 266 Mass. 540, 165 NE. 658 (1929);
Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Rhodes, 109 Va. 176, 63 S.E. 445 (1909); Coyle v. Pittsburgh
Rys, 149 Pa. Super. 281, 27 A.2d 533 (1942). But see Belledeau v. Connecticut Co.,
110 Conn. 625, 149 Ad. 127 (1930),
The policy behind such a rule is protection against false claims which may be too
easilv fabricated. Cf. Cardozo, Ch. J, in Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co, 250
N.Y. 479, 482, 166 N.E. 173, 174 (1929) ("He cannot help himself to a verdict
by the... facile comment that it threw him with a jerk.").
14. See 2 HAm & JAmES, ToRTt § 19.4 (1956); James, supra note 1, at 185-93;
cf. Western & Ad. RR. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929).
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the proven facts the nonexistence of the fact to be inferred appears to
be just as probable as its existence (or more probable than its existence),
then the conclusion that it exists is a matter of speculation, surmise, and
conjecture, and a jury will not be allowed to draw it.5 This test
suggests mathematical precision, but the suggestion is spurious. For
one thing, we lack the quantitative data about most matters which
would be needed to make meaningful statements in terms of probabilities.
Of course some broad generalizations would command general assent.
These are the judgments of "common sense," but even they are fallible.
How often the science of the morrow makes today's common sense
look foolish! Moreover the area is vast wherein thoughtful men who
accept today's common sense would either disagree or refuse to guess
on which side of the line the greater probability lay.
Another flaw in the test as usually formulated lies in the possibility
that courts may not mean it to be taken literally anyhow. One able court
has said that it "may be an overstatement of the quantum of proof
required .... ." 16 Another, looking in the opposite direction declared
that it is "not enough that mathematically the chances somewhat favor a
proposition to be proved; for example ... the fact that only a minority
of men die of cancer [would not] warrant a finding that a particular
man did not die of cancer." 17
It appears then that the test, formulated in terms which suggest
objective, scientific precision, is in fact one' which gives the courts
little guidance and great latitude. Even where expert evidence con-
cerning probabilities is available it is seldom offered. Instead, courts are
constantly asserting or assuming broad generalizations about human be-
havior and -all. sorts of other matters which either rest on their own
very fallible notions about such things (which, since judges are humar,'
often. reflect veritable old wives' tales current in the culture of- the
community), or spring from considerations 6f policy and expediency.
In addition to the previously discussed general test for the sufficiency
of circumstantial evidence, there is occasionally asserted a proscription
agaist "building aninference on an iiference." 18 No such test. has
ever been 'applied iiterailly and uniformly, nor is, tiher6 any ratioa4
1-5. See "PROSSER, .ToRi , -20 (d 'ed.195); Noh V. Raun, 149 F.2d 885, 888 (3d
Cir.), cert.. denied, 326 U.S.; 758 (1945).. .
16. Gutierrez v. Public Sev. J.nteSstate- nsp o., 168 F2d 678,*6' (2d Cir. i48j
:17,:Sargenqt v-. Massachusetts Acc. ,Co.;'307:Mass. 246; 250,:,2N1..E,2a,825, 827-.(-1940).
18. See I WIGMoRE 4 41; Annot.95 AL.R,'162 (1935).:
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justification for it.'9 Few cases are tried where inference is not piled
on inference two and three deep. A very simple and familiar example
will suffice. A man flees the scene of a crime or tort. From his flight
we may infer a consciousness of guilt; from the consciousness we may
reason to the fact of guilt.20 If the rule means simply that the jury
will not be allowed to draw an inference from proof which does not
point to it with sufficient probability, then its meaning is unobjection-
able, but the form of the statement is unfortunate and misleading. It
has sometimes been applied mechanically to preclude inferences that
seem well within the realm of what is reasonable by any rational
standard.2' The rule should be repudiated outright and in its stead
there should be used a statement such as the one recently made by a
California court that: "In a civil case, if the first inference is a reason-
ably probable one it may be used as a basis for a succeeding inference." 22
Another proscription often stated is that the disbelief of a denial
does not warrant an inference that the denied fact existed. In one case,
for example, where plaintiff had to prove that his decedent, climbing
down the side of a freight car on a siding, was actually seen by the
crew of an approaching train in time to sound warning, and where the
fireman and engineer testified that they did not see him though they
were keeping a proper lookout, the court held that a jury might not
infer that decedent was, seen from a disbelief of the engine crew's testi-
mony.23 The jury was not, of course, bound to have accepted the
testimony 'as true, but its rejection opens up many possibilities which
do not include the desired conclusion. The engineer and fireman may
not have been looking out at all or they may have been talking or joking
or distracted by something at the time. It may be argued therefore that
the probability that the crew did see the decedent does not appear great
enough to make the desired inference rational. This argument overlooks
the possibility that demeanor evidence "may satisfy the tribunal, not
only that the witness' testimony is not true, but that the truth is the
10. Ibid. -
20. See Kotler v. Lalley, 112 Conn. '86, 151 Ad. 433 -(1930); State v. Ford, 109 Conn.
490, 146 Ad. 828 (1929). "
21. See cases collected' i 1 WIGMORa S 41, at 434 n.2; 20 A.M. JUR., Evidence
S§ 164-65 (1939); -Annot., 95 A.L.R. 162, 175 n.22 (1935). -
22. Vdccarezza v* Sarigdinetti, 71 'Cal. App. -2d '687, 698, 16 P.2d 470,. 477, (Dist.
Ct. App. 1945); cf. Lemmon v. Paterson Constr. Co., 137' Conn. 158, Y5 A.2d 385
(1950); Annot., 95-A.L.R. 181-96 (1935). - ',- " - ... .. . , -
23. Crmtan v. New York C-.1c HR.R., -227 Mass. 594, 116 N.E. 879 (1917) appeal
disnissed per stipulation, 249 U.S. 621 (1918).
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opposite of his story ... ," 24 Moreover it often overlooks, as in the
case put, the trier's right to accept part of a witness' testimony (e.g.,
that he looked carefully and could see what was obvious) and reject
part" (e.g., that he failed to see a man clearly within the line of vision),
and the trier's indubitable right to find a fact from circumstantial evi-
dence over the denial of the person who alone has full knowledge of
the fact.28 Further, competing possibilities are often minimized or
eliminated in specific circumstances. These considerations throw doubt
on the case just described. Nevertheless the prevailing rule may be
justified in some contexts since its alternative would enable an un-
scrupulous litigant to make any allegation about his adversary's conduct
and get to the jury on the issue with nothing in the way of proof save
the possibility that his adversary's denial may be disbelieved.ar
So far the discussion has been confined to inferences of the existence
of simple facts. As we have seen many ultimate issues in litigation
involve also the evaluation or appraisal of simple facts in terms of their
legal consequences, and this evaluation also falls within the jury's
province. The issue of negligence in an accident case is a good example.
When it is said that there is insufficient evidence to warrant a finding
for the proponent on an issue which is complex or mixed in .this way,
the expression means that there are no facts which may legitimately be
found from the evidence (direct, real, and circumstantial) which a
jury will be allowed to evaluate as negligence, or the like .2  Thus the
concept of insufficiency has a double aspect when used in connection
with such an issue. It may involve a lack of proof of what the facts
were, so that evaluation is impossible. An example would be a decedent's
24. Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 1952).
25. See Pandolfo v. Acheson, 202 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1953); United States ex rel.
Leong v. O'Rourke, 125 F. Supp. 769 (W.D. Mo. 1954); Foshee v. Wolters, 86 Cal.
App. 2d 766, 195 P.2d 930 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948). But cf. Olney v. Carmichael, 202 Md.
226, 96 A.2d 37 (1953).
26. See Hamlin v. Roundy, 96 N.H. 123, 124, 71 A.2d 419, 420 (1950); Groves v.
City of Webster City, 222 Iowa 849, 270 N.W. 329 (1936); Clark v. Boston & Me.
R.R., 87 N.H. 36, 39, 173 Ad. 368, 370 (1934); ef. Gray v. Southern Pac. Co., 23 Cal.
2d 632, 145 P.2d 561 (1944).
27. The kind of situation found in Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265 (2d Cir.
1952), presents this possibility (although of course there is no reason whatever to
suppose any lack of scruples on the part of plaintiff in that particular case). The
reasoning of the court did not stress the point made in the text, but rather the im-
possibility of effective appellate review of any ruling based exclusively on demeanor
evidence which could not be brought before the appellate court. See id. at 269.
28. See 2 HARPER & JAmEs, Tors S 15.2, at 876-77 (1956).
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conduct leading up to his unwitnessed death. 29 But evidence may also
be called insufficient to show negligence, for instance, where all the
relevant facts are fully known-even admitted-if the court is unwilling
to let a jury characterize or evaluate those facts in the way which the
proponent claims and needs.30
The next question is what evidence is to be considered in determining
sufficiency? The answer is that part of the reasonably credible evidence
most favorable to the proponent. The concept of sufficiency is not
primarily concerned with credibility, nor with the choice among
competing permissible inferences;31 it is addressed to the court's function,
while credibility and persuasive effect are matters for the jury. This
means that all conflicts in the evidence are to be resolved against the
party who challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and this includes
conflicts and contradictions within a witness' or a party's own testi-
mony.3 2 And the proponent-such a challenge is always made against
a party having the production burden-is entitled to the most favorable
of competing rational inferences and to have inferences drawn from the
most favorable findings.33 It is the court's "function to determine
whether the evidence in its entirety would rationally support a verdict
for the plaintiff, assuming that the jury took, as it would be entitled
to take, a view of the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff." 84
While this test resolves conflicts in the evidence in favor of the pro-
ponent and therefore disregards that part of the evidence which favors
the opponent's side of those conflicts, this does not mean that all conflicts
are to be so resolved, or that all evidence unfavorable to the proponent
is to be disregarded. As we have seen, courts will not let credit be given
29. See Kotler v. Lalley, 112 Conn. 86, 151 Ad. 433 (1930).
30. See, e.g., Kimbar v. Estis, 1 N.Y.2d 399, 135 N.E.2d 708 (1956) (failure of boy's
camp to light paths in woods at night); Goldberger v. David Roberts Corp., 139 Conn.
629, 96 A.2d 309 (1953) (furnishing young boy with paddle); McDonald v. Fryberger,
233 Minn. 156, 46 N.W.2d 260 (1951) (leaving ordinary kitchen cabinet unfastened
to wall); HouAsrs, THE COMMON LAW 120-21 (1881).
31. See note 8 supra.
32. See Zullo v. Zullo, 138 Conn. 712, 89 A.2d 216 (1952); Connors v. Richards, 230
Mass. 436, 119 N.E. 831 (1918); cases cited note 25 supra; cf. Albaugh v. Pennsylvania
R.R, 120 F. Supp. 70 (D.D.C. 1954), aff'd, 219 F.2d 764 (D.C. Cir. 1955); cases cited
note 9 supra.
33. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53 (1949); Szukics v. Ruch, 367 Pa.
646, 81 A.2d 903 (1951); Lemieux v. Leonard Constr. Co., 73 R.I. 338, 58 A.2d 625
(1947); McDonald v. Metropolitan Sr. Ry, 167 N.Y. 66, 60 N.E. 282 (1901); Gostin
v. Scott, 80 Ga. App. 630, 56 S.E.2d 778 (1949).
34. Wilkerson v. McCarthy, supra note 33, at 65 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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to testimony which is flatly contradicted by indisputable physical facts
or laws of nature.3 5 And that part of the evidence which demonstrates
such contradiction (such as that which shows beyond doubt what view
a highway traveler would have looking down the tracks as he ap-
proached a railway crossing on a clear day) is not to be disregarded.3 6
While credibility is for the jury, courts set the outer limits of it. In
doing so they have the power to make serious inroads into the jury's
sphere, but in fact they have exercised this power with marked re-
straint.3
7
The question of credibility is sometimes raised in an entirely different
way by a motion to direct a verdict. Where the proponent, having
also the persuasion burden, offers testimonial evidence which strongly
supports his side of the case and the opponent fails to shake it on cross-
examination and offers no countervailing evidence, the proponent may
move for a directed verdict. If at this point no presumption operates
in the proponent's favor the question may arise whether the jury may
reasonably disbelieve his evidence. This is not usually described as a
problem of the sufficiency of evidence, but it has much in common with
that concept, for in the last analysis it comes down to a question whether
"demeanor evidence" may be sufficient to- warrant rejection of an
otherwise uncontradicted and unimpeached statement. A few states
answer the question in the affirmative and hold that a directed verdict
must be denied for that reason.38 However the prevailing view regards
the clear, uncontradicted, self-consistent, and unimpeached testimony
of even interested witnesses as sufficient basis for a directed verdict
in favor of the party having the persuasion burden as well as the initial
production burden.3" This amounts to a holding that reasonable men
35. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
36. See note 9 supra. In Gianotta v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 98 Conn. 743, 120
At. 560 (1923), the evidence showing the indisputable physical facts was introduced
by defendant. Similarly, much of it was also introduced by defendant in Piscitello v.
New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 116 Conn. 638, 166 Ad. 61 (1933), in which the court up-
held a directed verdict for defendant.
37. 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1 15.2, at 877 (1956); see note 10 supra.
38. Alexander v. Tingle, 181 Md. 464,. 30 A.2d 737 (1943); Woodin v. Durfee, 46
Mich. 424, 9 N.W. 457 (1881); Smith, supra note 3, at 121 n.47; Sunderland, Directing
a Verdict for the Party Having the Burden of Proof, 11 MicK. L. R~v. 198 (1913); see
9 W.IGMORE § 2495.
39. The cases are reviewed in an excellent opinion by Vanderbilt, C.J, in Ferdinand
.v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 22 N.J. 482, 126 A.2d 323 (1956). See also 9 WIGMoRE 5 2495;
Sunderland, supra note 38; Annot, 62 A.L.R.2d 1191 (1958).
In the Ferdinand. case the court held the direction of a verdict for plaintiff to be
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could not disbelieve such testimony on the basis of demeanor evidence.40
The sufficiency of the evidence is to be contrasted with the weight
of the evidence. The latter term is usually used to refer to the jury's
function and of course the jury is concerned with the weight of evidence
at least in the sense of its persuasive effect on their own minds. This
includes questions of credibility and choice among competing inferences
in the particular case before them. There is also another, more objective
sense in which the term weight of the evidence (or clear weight of the
evidence) is used. In many jurisdictions a trial court has wide discre-
tion to order a new trial where it believes the verdict to be against the
"weight" or "clear weight" of the evidence. In exercising this discre-
tion courts make some appraisal of credibility-more than they are
permitted on a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, but less than
the jury is permitted in making its own rather subjective judgment.
Obviously this test is even more vague and more dependent on im-
ponderable factors than is the test of what is not reasonably credible
as matter of law. It must necessarily be addressed largely to judicial
discretion. 1
PRE-VERDICT DEvIcES FOR CONTROLLING THE JURY
Having examined the concept of sufficiency of the evidence we shall
proceed to consider the various devices available during the trial for
implementing this concept and also for limiting the sphere of what the
jury may and should consider in those cases in which one or more
improper, but stated the general rule at 494, 126 A.2d at 329-30, thus:
Where men of reason and fairness may entertain differing views as to the truth
of testimony, whether it be uncontradicted, uncontroverted or even undisputed,
evidence of such a character is for the jury. . . But when the testimony of
witnesses, interested in the event or otherwise, is clear and convincing, not
incredible in the light of general knowledge and common experience, not
extraordinary, not contradicted in any way by witnesses or circumstances, and
so plain and complete that disbelief of the story could not reasonably arise in the
rational process of an ordinarily intelligent mind, then a question has been pre-
sented for the court to decide and not the jury.
40. Or perhaps to a judgment that the chance that a rational verdict will be based
on demeanor evidence in such a case, though theoretically possible, is "to the last
degree rare," and therefore should be disregarded because of the disadvantages entailed
in recognizing it (e.g., the fact that demeanor evidence cannot be preserved in the
record or recaptured on appeal). Cf. L. Hand, J., in Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d
265, 269 (2d Cir. 1952). The Dyer case involved an attempt to urge an inference of a
fact's existence from disbelief of a denial of its existence. That problem will be seen
to raise some of the questions presented here.
41. See note 67 infra and accompanying text; McBaine, Trial Practice: Directed
Verdicts; Federal Rule, 31 CALiF. L. REv. 454 (1943).
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issues are to be submitted to them. These are the mechanical devices,
so to speak, for the court's control of the jury. In reviewing them we
shall always try to be mindful of their relationship to the concepts
which they are designed to serve, and their relationship to each other.
A. Admission and Exclusion of Evidence
Courts do, of course, exercise control over the jury by deciding
what evidence they may hear. The bases for the rules admitting or
excluding evidence are related, for the most part, to legal concepts other
than the ones we are discussing-concepts usually treated under the
heading of evidence rather than under the present heading. It should,
however, be noted here that evidence which is excluded on objection or
struck out on later motion is not counted in measuring the sufficiency
of evidence.42 Evidence which is erroneously admitted over objection
will no doubt be counted by the trial judge, but if he changes his mind
he may thereafter disregard it on a later motion to take the case from
a jury,43 or he may grant a new trial because of his error." If the
erroneous ruling, admitting evidence over objection, is properly saved
for review on appeal, a reversal and new trial may result.45
There remains at this point the question of how evidence is to be
counted in testing sufficiency, where it has been admitted without
objection 8 but would have been excluded if objection had been made.
42. See Abramowitz v. Abramowitz, 137 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct. 1954). If the ruling
is erroneous and is properly saved for review on motion for new trial or on appeal,
it may bring about a new trial.
43. See Jacksonville Paper Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 260 Ala. 132, 69
So. 2d 411 (1953).
44. See cases collected in DEc. DIG., New Trial, Key No. 35.
45. See, e.g., Dairy & Ice Cream Supply Co. v. Gastonia Ice Cream Co., 232 N.C.
684, 61 S.E.2d 895 (1950); Niedner v. Wabash R.R., 219 S.W.2d 886 (Mo. Ct. App.
1949).
Even if the improperly admitted evidence was the only evidence, to support an
essential element in plaintiff's case, the disposition should generally be a new trial
rather than a judgment for defendant since "but for the court's ruling plaintiff might
have offered other proof." Dairy & Ice Cream Supply Co. v. Gastonia Ice Cream
Co, supra at 686, 61 S.E.2d at 897. But cf. Williams v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 136
Colo. 458, 319 P.2d 1078 (1957) (where trial court reversed finding of Industrial
Accident Commission on basis of evidence erroneously received over objection, held
award of Commission reinstated).
46. Or, rather, without proper objection. If the objection is not made on the proper
ground, it does not count. Thus relevant but inadmissible hearsay evidence, ad-
mitted over an objection that it is "incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial," will be
treated as though it came in without objection. See In re Estate of Fagin, 246 Iowa
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The answer to the question turns in part on the ground upon which the
evidence would have been excluded. If it is irrelevant to the issues in
the case, this means that it has no logical probative value and is not
entitled to consideration.47 If, however, the evidence is relevant and
the proper objection would be based on one of the exclusionary rules,
the answer may be different. Some of the exclusionary rules are based
on considerations which have nothing to do with the logical probative
value of the evidence they exclude.48 If such evidence comes in without
objection there seems to be no valid reason for a reluctance to consider
it for whatever it is worth. Evidence which is sufficient to prove a fact
under the ordinary canons of logical reasoning and relevancy should
not be shorn of that effect simply because it would have been excluded
as privileged had the privilege been claimed.4
Greater difficulty comes when the rule of exclusion includes some
considerations which involve the probative value of the evidence. An
example is the hearsay rule, and most of the apposite judicial decisions
concern relevant but inadmissible hearsay evidence which was admitted
without objection. Where W's testimony of what X said is offered
to show that what X said is true ("to prove the truth of the matter
asserted in such statement," as the classic phrase has it), then the trier
is asked to put faith in X's veracity (used in the broad sense to include
accuracy of observation, memory, expression, et cetera, as well as
honesty) although the adversary has no chance to cross-examine X
and the trier no chance to observe X's demeanor either in making the
statement or under cross-examination upon it. The hearsay rule rests
upon a faith in cross-examination to elicit flaws and defects in the
496, 66 N.W.2d 920 (1954); Keim v. D. B. Berelson & Co., 105 Cal. App. 2d 154, 233
P.2d 123 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951).
47. Thus if the parol evidence rule is regarded as a rule of substantive law which
renders parol evidence irrelevant once the agreement has become integrated in a writing,
the effect of this view wil be to exclude consideration of parol evidence though
admitted without objection. See Foster v. Wagner, 337 S.W.2d 485, 492 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1960); Cooper v. Vaughan, 81 Ga. App. 330, 58 S.E.2d 453 (1950); El Zarape
Tortilla Factory, Inc. v. Plant Food Corp., 90 Cal. App. 2d 336, 203 P.2d 13 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1949).
48. 8 WIGMORE S 2175.
49. See, e.g., Stalder v. Stone, 412 Ill. 488, 107 N.E.2d 696 (1952) (adoption proceed-
ing; grounds for adoption shown by affidavit of natural mother reciting her criminal
conduct without claim of privilege); Adams v. State, 200 Md. 133, 88 A.2d 556 (1952)
(abortion proven by testimony of women upon whom practiced); State v. Desilets, 96
N.H. 245, 73 A.2d 800 (1950) (lascivious acts shown by testimony of accomplice);
Burris v. Burris, 75 A.2d 514 (Del. Super. Ct. 1950) (action for divorce; affirmative
defense of adultery shown by admissions of plaintiff on cross examination).
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character and powers of the witness and in the statement itself, and
qualifying circumstances which the probing of cross-examination may re-
veal and which would put the statement in a different light.5 The exclu-
sion of hearsay, then, rests in large part upon the lack of guaranty of
trustworthiness of extrajudicial statements made without the opportunity
to cross-examine. The question is whether this lack is so serious that
hearsay statements should not be sufficient basis for finding the fact
asserted in such statement where it has been admitted in evidence
without objection.
Some courts, perhaps a majority, have taken the broad position that
relevant evidence, inadmissible under the hearsay or some other ex-
clusionary rule but admitted without objection, is in the case for all
purposes and that its weight is for the trier of facts.51 Others, a small
minority, have declared flatly that inadmissible hearsay has no probative
value and will not support a finding even though admitted without
objection.52
Perhaps* both views are too broad and uncritical. It is submitted that
no single answer should cover all hearsay statements. Not all hearsay
is equally untrustworthy, nor is it all of the same quality. Hearsay
ranges all the way from business records upon which practical men
would rely in lending large sums of money to idle village gossip which
50. See MORGAN, SoME, PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM oF
LinGATONr 106-41 (1956) [hereinafter cited as MORGAN]; 5 WGMoRE §§ 1360-65.
51. See, e.g., Pataskas v. Judeikis, 327 Mass. 258, 98 N.E.2d 265 (1951) (authentication
of handwriting by witness not shown to have familiarity; case turned on the authorship
of these letters and there was no other authentication); Stickel v. San Diego Elec.
Ry., 32 Cal. 2d 157, 195 P.2d 416 (1948) (conclusion of witness that decedent "must
have seen" the bus "because she tried to step on the gas"); Crampton v. Osborn, 356
Mo. 125, 201 S.W.2d 336 (1947) (inadmissible hearsay, admitted without objection, to
be given "its natural probative effect"); Ventromile v. Malden Elec. Co., 317 Mass.
132, 57 N.E.2d 209 (1944) (only evidence to show at trial that plaintiff slipped on wax
was plaintiff's testimony that she had so stated on prior occasion; held sufficient);
Barlow v. Verrill, 88 N.H. 25, 183 Ad. 857 (1936) (verdict supported by inadmissible
hearsay); Clark v. Reynolds, 125 Va. 626, 100 S.E. 468 (1919) (semble); Swegle v.
State Bd. of Equalization, 125 Cal. App. 2d 432, 436-37, 270 P.2d 518, 521 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1954) ("In ordinary civil actions incompetent evidence admitted without objec-
tion is sufficient to support a finding.").
There is an excellent collection of cases together with critical comment in Annot.,
104 A.L.R. 1130 (1936). See also 20 AM. JuR. Evidence §§ 1185, 1195 (1939).
52. See Burgess v. Small, 151 Me. 271, 117 A.2d 344 (1955); Knox Metal Prods., Inc. v.
Watson, 100 Ga. App. 832, 112 S.E.2d 295 (1959); Wright v. Dabbs, 220 S.W.2d 681, 685
(Tex. Civ. App. 1949). See generally 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 1034 (1942). Maine has
changed her position. See note 53 infra.
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responsible people would at once dismiss as worthless. 53 The law of
hearsay itself recognizes this diversity and has developed the famous
.exceptions to the hearsay rule in part, at least, because of the guaranties
,of trustworthiness found in some types of situations.54 And wherever
evidence is admitted, though hearsay, under one of the recognized
,exceptions to the exclusionary rule, it of course is counted in reckon-
ing sufficiency.55 But the exceptions do not by any means include all
the hearsay that men of affairs consider reliable; the field of inadmissible
hearsay today still covers a wide range."' It is not surprising, therefore,
to find that some courts will uphold a finding based on hearsay evidence
which has been admitted without objection if it is the kind upon which
responsible men would base practical judgments; and not otherwise.
7
The test should be an elastic one as a number of courts have concluded.
in recent, thoughtful opinions. 58
53. See the admirable analyses in Goldthwaite v. Sheraton Restaurant, 154 Me. 214, 145
A.2d 362 (1958); MORGAN 106-95. See also James, Book Review, 66 YALz L.J. 160 (1956).
In his last chapter, Professor Morgan shows how the present rules will often exclude
evidence which the intelligent and responsible layman would consider worthy of
,consideration, yet will often admit evidence which most of us would consider almost
worthless. MORGAN 169-95.
54. In 5 WIGMORE §§ 1420-22, Professor Wigmore states what he considers the
general principles underlying the hearsay exceptions (necessity and circumstantial
probability of trustworthiness); while in § 1425 he states his intention to take up
the application of these principles to each exception, and the succeeding chapters con-
tain the attempts to follow up this intention.
But see MORGAN 167-68:
An examination of the cases, however, shows no guaranty which would be
even a weak substitute for cross-examination and in many instances the so-
called substitute for the oath is merely an absence of a motive to falsify, not a
stimulus to tell the truth. -
55. See Crawley v. Selby, 208 Ga. 530, 67 S.E.2d 775 (1951).
56. See MORGAN 169-95; James, Book Review, 66 YALE L.J. 160 (1956).
57. See the careful appraisals in Goldthwaite v. Sheraton Restaurant, 154 Me. 214,
145 A.2d 362 (1958); In re Estate of Fagin, 246 Iowa 496, 66 N.W.2d 920 (1954);
Shepard v. Purvine, 196 Ore. 348, 248 P.2d 352 (1952).
Compare the similar problem of whether administrative findings may ever be sup-
ported by hearsay evidence, and if so, under what circumstances. See, e.g., Con-
solidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229-30 (1938); NLRB v. Englander Co.,
260 F.2d 67, 72 (9th Cir. 1958); Thompson v. County School Bd., 166 F. Supp. 529
(E.D. Va. 1958), aff'd sub nor. Hamm v. County School Bd., 263 F.2d 226 (4th Cir.
1959); Ferguson-Steere Motor Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 63 N.M. 137, 314 P.2d
894 (1957); Swegle v. State Bd. of Equalization, 125 Cal. App. 2d 432, 270 P.2d 518
(Dist. Ct. App. 1954); Derrick v. Board of Liquor Control, 98 Ohio App. 97, 128
N.E.2d 239 (1954); 1 WVIGMoRE § 4a-c.
58. See cases cited first paragraph of note 57 supra.
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B. Nonsuit, Directed Verdict, and Dismissal
All of these devices invoke the concept of the sufficiency of the
evidence.59 There has been some controversy over the questions of
whether credibility may be considered on some or all of these motions
and whether a judge may properly direct a verdict wherever he would
set aside an opposite one. 3 There may, to be sure, be some shadings
in the application of the sufficiency test for the different devices, and
among different jurisdictions. And there may once have been wider
variations in the test applied. But by and large the sufficiency test as
described above is used pretty uniformly in this country when any of
these devices is invoked,61 and the doctrinal differences referred to are
59. For comprehensive reviews of these various devices, see Galloway v. United
States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943); Thoe v. Chicago, M. & St. P.R.R., 181 Wis. 456, 195 N.W.
407 (1923); Hopkins v. Railroad, 96 Tenn. 409, 34 S.W. 1029 (1896).
The original common law device was the demurrer to the evidence, a phrase still
used in some states. These devices have different procedural incidents but they all
have this in common, that they test the legal sufficiency of the evidence.
Where the complaint fails to state a cause of action or claim for relief, but no
demurrer or motion to dismiss the complaint was filed in the pleading stage, the
question arises whether, upon a motion at the trial for nonsuit or directed verdict,
the sufficiency of the evidence is to be tested by the allegations which the complaint
does contain or by those which it ought to contain. This question is primarily one
of waiver of defenses. Courts take divergent views upon it. See, e.g., Buchanan v.
Heath, 210 Ga. 410, 80 S.E.2d 393 (1954); Carlson v. Bankers Trust Co., 242 Iowa
1207, 50 N.W.2d 1 (1951); Coleman v. Whisnant, 226 N.C. 258, 37 S.E.2d 693 (1946);
Harbin v. Hunt, 151 Ga. 60, 105 S.E.2d 842 (1921); Bradford v. City of Commerce,
91 Ga. App. 581, 86 S.E.2d 645 (1955); Note, 18 GA. B.J. 498 (1956); Note, 2 DRAIE
L. Rav. 18 (1952).
60. See, e.g., Blum v. Fresh Grown Preserve Corp., 292 N.Y. 241, 54 N.E.2d 809
(1944); Bank of United States v. Manheim, 264 N.Y. 45, 189 N.E. 776 (1934); McDonald
v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 167 N.Y. 66, 60 N.E. 282 (1901); Brizius, Directed Verdicts on
Uncontradicted Testimony, Trial Law. Guide, Nov. 1959, p. 87; McBaine, Trial
Practice: Directed Verdicts; Federal Rule, 31 CALIF. L. REv. 454 (1943); Smith, The
Power of the Judge To Direct a Verdict: Section 457-a of the New York Civil Practice
Act, 24 CoLTJM. L. RaV. 111 (1924); Note, The Motion for a Directed Verdict in
Indiana: An Evaluation of Present Standards, 32 INDw. L.J. 238 (1957).
61. See Kingston v. McGrath, 232 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1956) (same test in jury case
whether dismissal or directed verdict sought); Julien v. Barker, 75 Idaho 413, 272
P.2d 718 (1954) (nonsuit); Cooke v. Townley, 265 P.2d 1108 (Okla. 1954) (demurrer
to evidence or directed verdict); City of Lake Mills v. Veldhuizen, 263 Wis. 49, 56
N.W.2d 491 (1953) (nonsuit); McLeod v. Andrew Murphy & Son, Inc., 155 Neb. 318,
51 N.W.2d 620 (1952) (peremptory instruction or nonsuit); Peterson v. Bober, 79
N.D. 300, 56 N.W.2d 331 (1952) (directed verdict and dismissal); Lea v. Bridgeman,
228 N.C. 565, 46 S.E.2d 555 (1948) (nonsuit, prayer for instructions, or objection to
submission of issues); Schiff v. Oak Park Cleaners & Dyers, Inc., 9 Ill. App. 2d 1,
132 N.E.2d 416 (1955) (directed verdict or judgment n.o.v.); Copeland v.- Rabing,
110 Cal. App. 2d 631, 243 P.2d 119 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952) (nonsuit); cases cited note
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largely battles of words. 62
So far as credibility goes, all courts consider it on a motion for
directed verdict to the minimum degree of determining whether testi-
mony is capable of belief by reasonable men or is incredible as a matter
of law. No court will let a jury base a verdict on testimony which
is flatly contradicted by indisputable physical facts or laws of nature,"'
and few, if any courts are willing to go much further than that on
such a motion. 4 The real differences, for the most part, are in the
willingness to find contradiction with physical facts or some other basis
for declaring evidence incredible as matter of law. 5 Even here there
is today a fairly uniform reluctance to go very far in taking matters of
credibility from the jury."" The apparent differences lie in nomen-
clature. Some courts call the problem described in this paragraph one
of credibility, others do not.
As for equating the test for directing a verdict to that for setting
aside a verdict and granting a new trial, the matter is complicated by
the wide range among the tests used in different jurisdictions for setting
a verdict aside. These will not be examined in this article, and it
suffices here to point out two things: (1) the equation is more nearly
valid in some jurisdictions than it is in others, but the differences are
rather because of variations in the new trial test than because of any
59 supra.
In a case tried to the court without a jury some jurisdictions permit the judge to weigh
the evidence and make findings of fact upon a motion for dismissal at the close of
plaintiff's case. FED. R. Civ. P. 41 (b); Steffen, The Prima Facie Case in Non-Jury Trials,
27 U. Cm. L. Rrv. 94 (1959).
62. See Note, The Motion for a Directed Verdict in Indiana: An Evaluation of
Present Standards, 32 IND. L.J. 238 (1957), for an excellent treatment of this problem.
63. See Lohmann v. Wabash R.R., 364 Mo. 910, 269 S.W.2d 885 (1954); Cameron v.
Goree, 182 Ore. 581, 189 P.2d 596 (1948); Cincinnati, N. & C. Ry. v. Johnson, 281 Ky.
565, 136 S.'W.2d 769 (1940); Morris v. Chicago, M. & St. P.R.R., 1 Wash. 2d 587, 97
P.2d 119 (1939), aff'd per curLam on rehearing, 100 P.2d 19 (1940); Gianotta v. New
York, N.H. & H.R.R., 98 Conn. 743, 120 Ad. 560 (1923).
64. See Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53 (1949); Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U.S.
90 (1930); Jarman v. Philadelphia-Detroit Lines, 131 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1942); Kostial
v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 119 Ind. App. 377, 85 N.E.2d 644 (1949); cases cited
note 10 supra, ef. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Wichman, 220 F.2d 426 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 835 (1955); Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co. v. Shephard, 184 F.2d 945
(10th Cir. 1950); Young v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 156 Kan. 624, 135 P.2d 551
(1943).
65. Compare, e.g., Pennsylvania R.R. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333 (1933), waith
Wilkerson v. McCarthy, supra note 64.
66. See cases cited notes 10 64 supra. See generally 2 HARPER & JAMEs, ToRTs
55 15.2, 19.2 (1956).
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variation in the directed verdict test.67 (2) One formulation of the-
equation is that a verdict should be directed where "it would be the
duty of the court to set aside [a contrary] verdict and grant a new
trial." 68 If "duty" refers to that which would be sanctioned by reversal
on appeal (rather than only by the judge's inner sense of moral duty)
then the equation is largely true but adds nothing, since this duty would
exist only where the evidence to support the verdict was insufficient
in law.69
The motions for nonsuit, directed verdict, or dismissal test not only
the factual aspect but also the evaluative aspect of the concept of
sufficiency. 70 Here greater differences are probably found in the
availability of one of these motions than in the matter of credibility.
There has been a school of thought (Holmes was its leading mentor)
which would have the courts increasingly particularize the rules or
67. In general there are three different rules or tests for setting aside a verdict as
against the weight of the evidence in the various jurisdictions:
(1) In some states the trial court has a genuine and well-nigh unfettered discretion which
will not be deemed abused "where there is any evidence which would support a judg-
ment in favor of the moving party," and is in effect invited to act as a thirteenth juror.
See Hawk v. City of Newport Beach, 46 Cal. 2d 213, 219, 293 P.2d 48, 51 (1956); Caval-
laro v. Sharp, 84 R.I. 67, 121 A.2d 669 (1956); Oklahoma City v. Drinkvater, 271 P.2d
1108 (Okla. 1954); Denney v. Tate, 96 Ga. App. 3, 99 S.E.2d 296 (1957); McLaughlin v.
Broyles, 36 Tenn. App. 391, 255 S.W.2d 1020 (1952).
(2) In some states the trial court is forbidden to set aside a verdict if "on the
evidence" the jury could have reasonably found in accordance with the verdict as
rendered. See Kerrigan v. Detroit Steel Corp., 146 Conn. 658, 659, 154 A.2d 517, 518
(1959); Monihan v. Public Serv. Interstate Transp. Co., 22 N.J. Super. 149, 91 A.2d
585 (App. Div. 1952), cert. denied, 11 N.J. 215, 94 A.2d 215 (1953); Dyer v. Hastings,
87 Ohio App. 147, 94 NZ.2d 213 (1950).
(3) In most jurisdictions the trial court is given a role somewhere between those
prescribed by the two rules just described. Under this rule the judge should weigh
the evidence but should not interfere with the verdict
unless the verdict is dearly against the undoubted general current of the evi-
dence, so that the court can clearly see, that they have acted under somen mis-
take, or from some improper motive, or bias, or feeling.
Alsop v. Commercial Ins. Co., I Fed. Cas. 564, 571 (No. 262) (C.C.D. Mass. 1833). See
also Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Yeatts, 122 F.2d 350 (4th Cir. 1941); 6 MooRE, FEDERAL
PRAcnc- 59.08 [5] (2d ed. 1954).
The tests laid down for the guidance of the trial court (the subject of the present
note) are not to be" confused with the rules to be applied by appellate courts in.
reviewing the trial court's action, although the two necessarily overlap.
68. Blum v. Fresh Grown Preserve Corp., 292 N.Y. 241, 244, 54 N.E.2d 809, 810 (1944)
(All italicized in original.); cf. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 457a.
69. See Blum v. Fresh Grown Preserve Corp., supra note 68, at 245, quoting Brown v.
Mohawk & H.R.R., I How. App. Cas. 52, 66 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1847).
70. 2 HARPER & JAMEs, ToRTs S 15.3 (1956).
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standards of conduct for people to follow in recurring situations.71
This view would make itself felt through manipulation of the concept
of sufficiency of evidence (e.g., no evidence would be sufficient to
support a claim unless it showed a deviation from the fixed standard)
and be implemented by the more frequent granting of the motions
under discussion. This school of thought has lost ground in the present
century, especially in personal injury tort cases.72
Also, there is probably more variation among decisions concerning
the legitimacy of inferences from circumstantial evidence than con-
cerning credibility. 73 And here, too, as in the matter of evaluation con-
duct, the tendency has probably been in the direction of allowing the
jury greater latitude in drawing inferences, notably in personal injury
tort cases.74
The changes described in the last two paragraphs are, it seems,
manifestations of deeper changes in the substantive law and in the
attitude of society towards the proper solution of the problem of ac-
cident victims in our increasingly mechanized society. These attitudes
are not yet fully reflected in the announced rules of substantive law
and one (conscious or unconscious) response to this fact has been the
enlargement of the jury's sphere. 75
C. Instructions to the Jury
It is the common law tradition that in all civil jury trials the judge
has the right and duty to instruct the jury upon the substantive law
71. See Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Berkshire, 254 U.S. 415 (1921); Lorenzo v. Wirth, 170 Mass. 596, 49 N.E. 1010
(1898); HOLMES, THE COmMON LAW 110-29 (1881).
72. See 2 HARPa & JAmEs, ToRTs § 15.3 (1956); Nixon, Changing Rules of Liability
in Automobile Accident Litigation, 3 LAw & CoNTEMp. PROB. 476 (1936); Searl,
Automobile Liability Law Development and Trend, 39 BEsr's INSuRAxNC NEws 585
(Fire & Cas. ed. 1938).
73. See, e.g., Dillon v. Rockaway Beach Hosp. & Dispensary, 284 N.Y. 176, 30 N.E.2d
373 (1940), where, though the Court of Appeals' conclusions seem reasonable enough,
the trial court and the Appellate Division had both taken a narrower view of the
evidence. Compare Morrison v. Le Torneau Co., 138 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1943), with
Eickhoff v. Beard-Laney, Inc., 199 S.C. 500, 20 S.E.2d 153 (1942).
74. This is perhaps best illustrated by the increasingly liberal application of res
ipsa loquitur. See James, Proof of the Breach in Negligence Cases (Including Res
Ipsa Loquitur), 37 VA. L. REv. 179 (1951), especially at 198 n.59, which contrasts older
and newer cases dealing with the unexplained breaking of machinery. Cf. Wilkersoi
v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53 (1949); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Chamberlain, 288 US. 333
(1933).
75. See James, Tort Law in Midstrean: Its Challenge to the Judicial Process, 8
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applicable to all the ultimate issues made by the pleadings and the
proof.76 This duty was not dependent on the making of any requests
to charge by parties7T-to this extent it represents a departure from
notions of party presentation and prosecution and an instance of judicial
responsibility for seeing that certain steps in the litigation process are
taken, and properly taken. In this tradition the judge often sums up
the evidence in the course of his charge and indicates just how the legal
rules should be applied to the various factual findings permissible under
the evidence.78 Moreover he may also comment on the weight of the
evidence and indicate his own opinion concerning the credibility of
witnesses and the relative strength of competing permissible inferences,
provided always that he makes it clear to the jury that it is their province
to decide such questions of weight and credibility. 9
Because of the judge's position of prestige and respect in the trial
his charge can be used to exert a good deal of psychological influence
on the jurors, who are laymen and sometimes inexperienced and im-
pressionable. This influence is enhanced by the timing of the charge-
it occurs after arguments of counsel and is the last significant event at
the trial before the jury's deliberation. All this was not regarded as a
disadvantage of the procedure but rather as an essential safeguard
against the jury's possible ignorance and undue susceptibility to appeals
to the "passional elements" in their nature. "It is not too much to say
of any period, in all English history," says Thayer, "that it is impossible
BurrALo L. REv. 315, 342-44 (1959); Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensation Acts,
27 HARv. L. REv. 235, 344, 367 (1914); note 72 supra.
76. THAYER 112-14; Farley, Instructions to Jwries-Their Rdle in the Judicial Process,
42 YA a L.J. 194 (1932).
77. For modem cases which follow the common law in this respect see Cipollone
v. D'Alessandro-Crognale, Inc., 333 Mass. 469, 131 N.E.2d 754 (1956); McNeill v.
McDougald, 242 N.C. 255, 87 S.E.2d 502 (1955); Shiers v. Cowgill, 157 Neb. 265, 59
N.W.2d 407 (1953); Reithof v. Pittsburgh Rys., 361 Pa. 489, 65 A.2d 346 (1949); Perl-
man v. Haigh, 90 N.H. 404, 10 A.2d 228 (1939); Investors Syndicate v. Thompson, 172
Ga. 203, 158 S.E. 20 (1931).
A general description of the patterns in use in America, based on correspondence
with trial lawyers, appears in AR~oui & JAmES, CAsEs oN TmuIs, JuDGNMiETs AND
APPEALS 676-79 (1936).
78. See 9 WIGMORIE § 2551; Wright, Instructions to the jury: Summary Without
Comment, 1954 WAsH. U.L.Q. 177. According to Professor Wright 19 American
states permit a factual summary either with or without comment. Id. at 206-07.
79. See Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466 (1933); Sheahan v. Barry, 27 Mich.
217, 226-27 (1873); 9 WIGMOMa S 2551; Sunderland, The Inefficiency of the American
Jury, 13 MIcH. L. Rev. 302, 305 (1915). See generally Wright, The Invasion of Jury:
Temperaiure of the War, 27 TEMP. L.Q. 137 (1953).
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to conceive of trial by jury as existing there in a form which would
withhold from the jury the assistance of the court in dealing with the
facts." SO
The basic features of instructions to the jury which have just been
described are found today in the federal courts and those of several
of the states."- But the nineteenth century witnessed. a popular political
movement which led to, among other things, an aggrandizement of the
importance and stature of the jury (as the popular branch of the
tribunal) and to a corresponding diminution of the importance and
stature of the judge. S2 Among the results of this movement, several
are pertinent to the present subject matter: (1) statutes and even con-
stitutional provisions forbidding judges to comment upon the evi-
dence;83 (2) rules and statutes relieving the court of its traditional duty
to take the initiative in covering the whole law of the case in its charge,
and requiring the court to charge only upon points expressly covered
by specific requests to charge; 4 (3) and rules requiring the charge to be
given before final arguments of counsel.85
The most extreme steps to reduce the judge's function are to be found
in Mississippi where the judge is forbidden to give any charge upon
points not requested by counsel and the clerk simply marks the parties'
request as "given" or "refused." S6 The granted requests are then read
to the jury by the attorneys before they argue the case.8
These steps towards diminution of judicial responsibility and control
80. TavmR 188 n.2.
81. The present status of the rules in the various states may be found in the follow-
ing articles: Wright, Adequacy of Instructions to the Jury, 53 Micn. L. REv. 505, 813
(1955) (pts. 1-2); Wright, supra notes 78 and 79.
82. See Sunderland, supra note 79, at 307-09.
83. Ibid; see Wright, supra notes 78, 79 and 81.
84. As in Mississippi, see McElroy, Procedural Aspects of Motions and Instructions,
30 Miss. L.J. 413, 419-21 (1959); as in Missouri, see Otis, The Judge to the jiry, 6 U.
KAN-. Ci- L. REv. 3, 4-6 (1937); Wright, supra note 78, at 180-82; as in Virginia, see
Catterall, Trial by Jury in Virginia: The Power of the Judge To Comment on the
Facts, 28 VA. L. REv. 106 (1941); Wright, Adequacy of Instructions to the Jury: 1,
53 Mics. L. REv. 813, 821-22 (1955).
85. As in Wyoming, Nevada, Kansas, Nebraska and Utah. See Wright, supsa note
78, at 183-89. Compare Blatt, Judge's Charge to Jury Should Precede Arguments of
Counsel, 33 J. Am. JuD. Soc', 56 (1949), ,with Hartshorne, The Timing of the Charge
to the Jury, 33 J. Am. Jun. Soc'y 90 (1949).
86. Miss. CoDE ANN. S 1530 (1942); Producers Gin Ass'n v. Beck, 215 Miss. 263, 60
So. 2d 642 (1952); see ARNOLD & JAMES, op. cit. supra note 77, at 677.
87. McElroy, supra note 84, at 420.
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have been widely condemned by commentators and there are some in-
dications that the tide has turned the other way.8
Because of the differences in practice just described it is difficult to
make valid generalizations about what a charge should and should not
contain. The rules that follow are, however, widely applied.
The charge should tell the jury which questions are for them to decide
and which are not.89 Usually this means that the judge tells the jury
what the issues are and what rule or rules of substantive law they should
apply to the various possible findings of fact they might make under
the evidence. And the judge should explain to the jury which party has
the burden of proof (persuasion burden) on each issue and the measure
to which they must be persuaded before that burden is met."° The
court usually tells the jury that questions of the credibility of witnesses
are for them to decide."' It may also give them some guide for drawing
rational inferences of fact.9 2
If the proponent has failed to meet his production burden on the
whole case or on some element necessary for recovery the court will,
as we have seen, take the case from the jury by nonsuit, directed verdict,
or dismissal.93 But it often happens that a proponent who is entitled to
go to the jury on some issues fails to meet his production burden on an
issue which is not necessarily dispositive of the whole case. It then
becomes the judge's- duty to withdraw that issue from the jury's con-
sideration. 4 It is error to leave to the jury an issue which is not
properly in the case under the evidence and the pleadings,95 except
where the pleadings are treated as amended to accommodate an issue
litigated by consent, 6 or the like.
88. Wright, supra note 79.
89. See ARNoLD & JAMES, op. cit. supra note 77, at 712-15; 1 REID's BRANSON, INSTRUC-
TIoNs To JuRIEs § 1-5 (repl. ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as BRANsoN]; Farley, supra
note 76, at 205-10.
90. It has been pointed out that in many states it is not error to omit such an instruc-
tion in civil cases in the absence of a request to charge. 1 BRANsoN § 61.
91. 1 BRANSON §§ 37-41, 68, 69 (indicating some standard guides given to jury
for assessing credibility).
92. 1 BRANSON § 20.
93. See text accompanying notes 59-75 supra.
94. If the issue has not been brought to the jury's attention in any way, there may
be no occasion to mention it in the charge at all.
95. State ex rel. Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Ellison, 270 Mo. 645, 195 S.W. 722
Z1917); Norfolk So. R.R. v. Norfolk Truckers' Exch., Inc., 118 Va. 650, 88 S.E. 318
(1916); see 1 BRANsON § 50; Farley, supra note 76, at 207.
96. As under FED. R. Civ. P. 15 (b).
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The court may determine that on one permissible version of the facts
there would be no question of evaluation properly for the jury, while
on another permissible version there would be such a question for them.
Suppose, for example, one witness puts the speed of defendant's auto-
mobile at twenty miles an hour, another at forty. If the judge believes
that the former speed could not reasonably be found negligent under
the circumstances, while the latter might, he should give a conditionally
binding instruction on the point. He should tell them that if they find
the speed to have been twenty miles an hour they must find the driver
free from negligence in this particular, but that if they find the speed
to have been forty miles an hour, they should then go on to determine
whether that was a reasonable speed under all the circumstances.97
It constitutes error to give a binding instruction where the matter
of evaluation is properly for the jury.98
Where it is a question for the court what the construction of a
writing is, or whether given facts constitute probable cause in malicious
prosecution, the court will-if the case is for the jury at all-tell them
that the written words have such and such meaning,99 or that such and
such facts do (or do not) constitute probable cause. 100
If the case is one in which parol evidence is admissible as an aid in
construing a contract, it is up to the jury to resolve any conflicts re-
vealed by the parol evidence and also to resolve any question of con-
struction "if, when all the evidence is in, both written and oral, fair-
minded men might reasonably arrive at different conclusions" upon it. 10 1
The charge must not assume the existence or the nonexistence of a
fact in issue. 102
All jurisdictions allow for the filing by the parties of requests to
97. 2 HARPER & JA ES, TORTS q 15.4 (1956); SHULMAN & JAMES, CAsES ON TORTS 188-89
(2d ed. 1952).
98. Maher v. Connecticut Co., 113 Conn. 556, 155 Ad. 854 (1931).
99. De Shields v. Insurance Co. of No. America, 125 S.C. 457, 118 S.E. 817 (1923);
see I BRANSON S 13.
100. Patrick v. Wigley, 206 Okla. 194, 242 P.2d 423 (1952); Byers v. Ward, 368 Pa.
416, 84 A.2d 307 (1951); Carson v. Doggett, 231 N.C. 629, 58 S.E.2d 609 (1950); see
THAYER 221-32.
101. Geoghegan Sons & Co. v. Arbuckle Bros., 139 Va. 92, 101, 123 S.E. 387, 389
(1924); see Terminal Constr. Corp. v. Bergen County, 18 N.J. 294, 113 A.2d 787
(1955); Swift v. McMurray, 133 Okla. 104, 271 Pac. 635 (1927); MacIntyre v. Angel,
109 Cal. App. 2d 425, 240 P.2d 1047 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952).




charge. 10 3 A rule or statute usually prescribes a time for filing such
requests (e.g., at the close of the evidence) and requires them to be
in writing.104 Other requirements, separately numbered paragraphs,
citation of supporting authority, et cetera, may also be imposed. 1 5
The importance of requests to charge varies among the different
jurisdictions, inversely with the duty of the court to instruct fully upon
the ultimate issues. As one court has recently put it, even where there
are no requests a federal court must nevertheless charge "on the broad
general fundamental rules of law applicable to the principal issues of
fact in the case." I0' And if there is a failure in this regard, an objection
taken as required by the rule will preserve the rights of the objecting
party. If, however, counsel wants the jury instructed specifically on
a particular matter, requests for such instructions must be filed as a
condition to putting the trial court in error for a failure to cover the
"particular matter." 1'1 Thus in a negligence case the trial judge will
be bound to give the general formula for negligence as being conduct
involving a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm to others under
the circumstances. And the judge on his own initiative may, and often
will, mention the circumstances which he thinks significant. But if
a party wishes to compel him to mention any particular circumstance
(on pain of being in error for an omission to do so) then he should
file a request to charge the jury upon that circumstance. S
Even under this rule it will often be desirable, though perhaps not
necessary, to file requests to charge for the purposes of: (1) getting
before the judge a party's legal theory of the case (especially where
that is likely to be unusual or unfamiliar); (2) clarifying legal points
in advance of argument of counsel, so that the argument may be shaped
in accordance with the law as the judge will declare it.
Under procedural systems which condition the judge's duty to
charge upon the filing of a proper request on the point in question,
the importance of filing such requests is obviously greater than under
the common law rule.
103. See 1 BRANSON §§ 150-61 for a general treatment of requests to charge.
104. See FED. R. Civ. P. 51.
105. See 1 BRANSON § 154; CoNNECcCUT PRACTICE BOOK § 153 (1951).
106. Turner Constr. Co. v. Houlihan, 240 F.2d 435, 439 (1st Cir. 1957).
107. Ibid.
108. Even where no request to charge upon a particular circumstance is filed,
the court may be in error if it selects other circumstances for mention in its charge
and omits reference to a circumstance that has attained litigious importance at the
trial. See 1 BRANSON §§ 105-06.
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Under either system the framing of proper requests to charge is
something of an art. Clearly the request must embody a correct state-
ment of substantive law and avoid all the pitfalls which the charge
itself must avoid, such as the assumption of a fact in issue. An unneces-
sary difficulty is commonly encountered by ending a request with a
direction to find for one party or the other. Such a request will be
proper only if all the conditions for plaintiff's recovery or defendant's
verdict, as the case may be, are included in the single request, 19 and
such inclusion will usually make the request cumbersome and unwieldy,
unless it deals with broad legal propositions.
If a request clearly identifies a point upon which the party filing it is
entitled to a charge, but is improper in form or substance, the question
arises whether the trial court will be in error if it fails to give a proper
instruction on the point. There is certainly authority that where the
meaning of a request is reasonably apparent, and its subject matter is
significant and not sufficiently covered by the general charge, a court
would be unjustified in ignoring the request merely because it is
susceptible of such an interpretation as to make its proposition not
absolutely accurate.110 Yet the instances are legion where the appellate
court finds no error on the ground that the request is inaccurate or
not in conformity with the rules.' So complete is appellate discretion
to choose one or the other of these attitudes in any specific case, and
so reluctant are such courts to reverse except where error is clear or a
clear miscarriage of justice is sensed, counsel is well advised to frame
important requests with precision and care.
Most jurisdictions require a party to make specific objections to
the charge as a condition to appellate review of statements or omissions
in the charge." 2 Such objections are generally made at the close of
the charge before the jury retires.1 13 The provision to this effect in
Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to be read in con-
nection with Rule 46 which dispenses with the need for formal excep-
tions wherever a party makes known to the court what he wants the
109. E.g., Dwyer v. Connecticut Co., 103 Conn. 678, 131 Atl. 838 (1925).
110. Montgomery v. Virginia Stage Lines, Inc., 191 F.2d 770, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1951)
(request embodying applicable regulations of ICC "not entirely correct"); see Annes
v. Connecticut Co., 107 Conn. 126, 129, 139 Ad. 511, 512 (1927) (request embodying
applicable last clear chance doctrine "of somewhat doubtful accuracy").
111. See 1 BPANsoN S 180, at 485; DEc. DIG., Trial, Key No. 261.
112. See 1 BRANsoN SS 170-75.
113. Id. at 471.
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court to do and why, or "his objection to the action of the court and
his grounds therefor." Taking these two rules together, courts of
appeals have held that points clearly raised in proper requests to charge
need not be repeated by objection at the close of a charge which failed
to give such a request.114
D. Special Verdicts and Interrogatories
The special verdict emerged at common law as a device by which
the jury might protect itself from some of the dangers of attaint;"'
but it became transformed on this side of the Atlantic into a device
for judicial control of juries, to be utilized at the judge's option.,
While the special verdict-at the court's insistence-has never become
a common thing in America, it remains as an available device sometimes
resorted to today. Its infrequency is due to its clumsiness and dif-
ficulty. To support a judgment the verdict has to include findings
upon all the material facts in issue, and it must do so by stating without
ambiguity facts, not evidence or conclusions of law. It is not easy to
frame such a verdict (or questions which will elicit it) in the heat of
trial, and the history of special verdicts is "a rocky road strewn with
innumerable wrecks." 117
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seek to avoid some of this
difficulty. Rule 49(a) provides that if, in submitting a case to the
jury (by interrogatories or otherwise) for their special verdict, "the
court omits any issue of fact raised by the pleadings or by the evidence,
each party waives his right to a trial by jury of the issue so omitted un-
less before the jury retires he demands its submission to the jury." The
court is then given the power to make findings of fact upon the omitted
issue, and even its failure to do so is to be supplied by the assumption
of a finding "in accord with the judgment on the special verdict." 118
The submission to the jury of interrogatories to be answered along
with their general verdict is a device which has become available in
114. E.g., Montgomery v. Virginia Stage Lines, Inc., 191 F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir. 1951)
Wright v. Fa.m Journal, Inc., 158 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1947); Williams v. Powers, 135
F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1943).
115. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 353 (1930); see THAYER 217-19; cf. Morgan, A Brief
History of Special Verdicts and Special Interrogatories, 32 YALE L.J. 575, 588-91 (1923).
116. See CLEMENTSON, SPECIAL VERDICTS 8 (1905); GREEN, op. cit. supra note 115,
at 353; Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253, 258 (1920).
117. Sunderland, supra note 116, at 261.
118. FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a).
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most jurisdictions.1 19 It does not suffer the same impediment as the old
special verdict and has enjoyed wider use."" In a few states the practice
of submitting such interrogatories has become required or a matter of
course in all civil cases.121
Rule 49(b) of the Federal Rules expressly provides for such inter-
rogatories. It also makes explicit provision about what should be done
where difficulty is posed by the jury's answers. In the usual case the
answers to the interrogatories will be consistent with each other and
harmonious with the general verdict. The judge should then "direct the
entry of the appropriate judgment upon the verdict and answers." 122
Where, however, the answers are consistent with each other but one
or more is inconsistent with the general verdict, the court may do
one of three things: (1) direct entry of judgment in accordance with
the answers, notwithstanding the general verdict; (2) return the jury
for further consideration of its answers and verdict; or (3) order a new
trial.1 23 The last two courses of action are open to the court (in the
alternative) where the answers are inconsistent with each other, "and
one or more is likewise inconsistent with the general verdict." 124 In
such case the court is not, however, to direct the entry of judgment.
In administering these provisions courts should be astute to reconcile
answers with each other and with the verdict where this is reasonably
possible.2 5
Under the typical American pattern, including that in the federal
courts, it is not the parties' option to require a special verdict or pro-
pound interrogatories; the choice lies with the court and rests largely
119. CLEMENTSON, op. cit. supra note 116, at 16-41; GREEN, op. cit. supra note 115,
at 354-55; Morgan, supra note 115, at 591-92; Wicker, Special Interrogatories to Juries
in Civil Cases, 35 YALE L.J. 296 (1926).
120. Although it is not expressly stated, this is the clear implication of the works
by Green and Wicker cited in note 119 supra.
121. See GREEN, op. cit. supra note 115, at 355-74 (describing practice in North
Carolina, Texas, and Wisconsin); Frank, The Case for the Special Verdict, 32 J. AM.
JUD. Soc'Y 142, 147-48 (1949).
122. Fa. R. Civ. P. 49(b).
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid.
125. See, e.g., Morris v. Pennsylvania R.R., 187 F.2d 837, 840 (2d Cir. 1951); Gulf
Ref. Co. v. Fetschan, 130 F.2d 129 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 764 (1943);
In re Estate of Erwin, 170 Kan. 728, 228 P.2d 739 (1951); Tobin v. Van Orsdol, 241
Iowa 1331, 45 N.W.2d 239 (1950); Klever v. Reid Bros. Express, Inc., 151 Ohio St. 467,
86 N.E.2d 608 (1949); Ford v. Carpenter, 147 Tex. 447, 216 S.W.2d 558 (1949); Wicker,
supra note 119, at 304; cf. Golden No. Airways v. Tanana Publishing Co, 218 F.2d
612, 618 (9th Cir. 1954).
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in its discretion, though either party may request such action.120 In
the federal courts and in most states judges do not in fact require special
verdicts or propound interrogatories in the majority of civil cases, 127
although there is a school of thought which would extend their use.128
There are several possible advantages of special verdicts and inter-
rogatories. First, they tend to localize error and avoid the necessity
for many reversals on appeal, while the grounds of a general verdict are
often not ascertainable."' For example, in the typical negligence case
the issues made by the pleadings include defendant's negligence, its
causal relation to plaintiff's claimed injury, the existence and extent
of injury, and the plaintiff's contributory negligence. A general verdict
for plaintiff implies a finding on each one of these issues, but a general
verdict for defendant does not, since it may rationally be grounded
on any onc of a number of possible combinations of findings. A finding
adverse to plaintiff on any one of the issues,'" for instance, will call
for a defendant's verdict no matter what the jury finds on the other
issues.
Suppose now there has been error in the charge, or in the admission
of evidence, which goes to one issue only, such as contributory negli-
gence, and the trial results in a defendant's verdict. It is apparent that
the error may have had no part whatever in producing the verdict since
126. See Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 167 F.2d 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 816 (1948); 1 BRANSON § 161.
127. Sunderland stated that in this country jury trial is "almost universally ad-
ministered" by use of the general verdict. Sunderland, supra note 116, at 254-55. Green
refers to the taking of a general verdict as "the normal method" GREEN, op. cit. supra
note 115, at 350. An assumption that this is the fact seems quite clearly to underlie
Judge Frank's pleas for interrogatories found in Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 167
F.2d 54, 56-70 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 816 (1948). Cf. Rossman, The Judge-
Jury Relationship in the State Courts, 3 F.R.D. 98, 107-10 (1944).
128. See, e.g., Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R.R., supra note 127, at 56, 70 (opinions of
Frank and Hand, JJ.); GaRE.N op. cit. supra note 115, at 350-74; Rossman, supra note 127;
Wicker, supra note 119. Contrast the opinions of Clark and Frank, JJ., in Morris v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 187 F.2d 837, 843 (2d Cir. 1951).
129. That is, they are not ascertainable even on a theoretical basis. Juries in fact have
the power to decide cases on grounds which they are not supposed to consider-indeed
those which they have been forbidden to consider. For many purposes, however,
the law blandly assumes that juries do what they are told by the court to do. That
assumption is being made in the present and immediately succeeding paragraphs of the
text.
130. Including total lack of injury, since actual damage to plaintiff is an essential




the verdict could have been based on a finding, e.g., that defendant him-
self was not negligent. Nevertheless the error mzay have contributed
to producing the result, and since that is so the prevailing appellate rule
in America requires reversal and a new trial.131 If, however, the appellate
court can see from the record that the result in the first trial would
necessarily have been the same even if the error had not occurred,
then the error will be regarded as "harmless" and "non-prejudicial," and
a reversal is not called for. 32 Since the answers to interrogatories may
reveal that findings on issues other than the one infected by error
required the verdict which was rendered, they will frequently show
that an error is harmless and non-prejudicial.
Another possible advantage of these devices is that the instructions
may be rendered less cumbersome and difficult to frame and to under-
stand. This benefit might accompany the special verdict but not (to
anything like the same extent, at least) the general verdict taken along
with answers to interrogatories. Ordinarily the charge must indicate
what law would be applicable to each of the possible findings and
combinations of findings which a jury might make from the evidence.
This calls for stating each of these findings in hypothetical form and
often leads to instructions involving many near-repetitions to accom-
modate slight factual variations among permissible findings which
would be attended by different legal consequences. Not only are such
charges hard for the court to frame and for the jury to follow, 133
but they are a prolific source of error.134 Since the special verdict
records only the, jury's findings of fact (which would include evalua-
tions within its sphere, for instance, of what is "reasonable") there is
no need for the court to charge upon those legal consequences which are
131. See, e.g., Fillippon v. Albion Vein Slate Co., 250 U.S. 76 (1919) (instruction
to jurv in absence of parties and counsel); Ferderer v. Northern Pac. Ry., 75 N.D.
139, 26 N.-,V.2d 236 (1947) (instruction to jury in absence of parties and counsel);
Poultryland, Inc. v. Anderson, 200 Ga. 549, 37 S.E.2d 785 (1946) (refusal of a timely
request for sequestration of witnesses); Sweeney v. Vierbuchen, 224 Ind. 341, 66 N.E.2d
764 (1946) (erroneous instruction on attorney-client relationship); Kimball v. Borden,
95 Va. 203, 28 S.E. 207 (1897) (erroneous instruction on negligence); Gurwell v.
Jefferson City Lines, Inc., 239 Mo. App. 305, 192 S.V.2d 683 (1946) (erroneous ad-
mission of medical opinion).
132. Morris v. Pennsylvania R.R., 187 F.2d 837, 841 (2d Cir. 19.1); see Sunderland,
supra note 116, at 259; Wicker, supra note 119, at 306.
133. GREEN, Op. cit. supra note 115, at 351; Sunderland, supra note 116, at 259.
134. ARNOLD & JAMES, CASES ON TRIALS, JUDGMENTS AND APPEALS 676-77 (1936);
GREE;N, op. cit. supra note 115, at 351. See generally 1 BRANSON § 180; Farley, Instruc-
tions to Juries-Their Rd1e in the Judicial Process, 42 YALE L.J. 194, 202 (1932).
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within the court's province to decide upon, or to frame hypothetical
instructions in terms of those consequences.
Where it falls within the jury's province to decide most, or many
of the significant legal consequences-as in the typical personal injury
negligence case' 35-this advantage of the special verdict is minimized.
As a third advantage, these devices put psychological pressure on the
jury to stick to the performance of their theoretical functions and to
keep them from deciding cases on grounds which they are supposed-
again, in theory-to ignore. They exert this pressure by focussing jury
attention on the questions which are allocated to them for decision
and requiring the jury to record their answers to these questions. This
is the "advantage" most commonly emphasized by modem protagonists
of the special verdict or interrogatories. 36 Whether it is in fact ad-
vantageous in some or any cases is a question upon which men stand
deeply divided.
The jury's only theoretical functions are to find from the evidence
what the simple facts are and to make some (but not all) legal evalua-
tions of these facts, in the manner prescribed by the judge's charge.
Serious critics of jury trial feel that juries do not perform even these
functions well, and that the disadvantages of jury trial outweigh its
benefits. But the jury is so firmly ensconced among American institu-
tions that there is no practical likelihood of its abolition, so these
critics turn to devices which will limit the jury's power and at least
keep it from extending beyond the reservation allotted to it by legal
theory.""T
Others accept jury trial, believing that juries perform the necessary
functions better than would a single judge, but agree with the serious
critics in thinking that juries should be confined to their theoretical
tasks."' Both these groups welcome interrogatories and special verdicts
as means for keeping juries within bounds.
Throughout the jury's history it has been recognized that juries do
not always stick to their theoretical function and apply the law in the
judge's charge to the facts as they find them. Juries sometimes take the
135. 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 15.3, 17.1-.2 (1956).
136. See, e.g., CLEMENTSON, Op. cit. supra note 116, at 12; Frank, supra note 121, at
147; Sunderland, supra note 116, at 262; Wicker, supra note 119, at 306.
137. See Frank, supra note 121, at 142-43. See generally FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL
108-45 (1949); GREEN, op. cit. supra note 115, at 395-417.
138. This seems to have been the attitude of Wicker, supra note 119.
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law into their own hands and decide a case according to popular preju-
dice, which often embodies lay notions of what the law ought to be.
This, of course, is the very thing that the two groups just described
unite in deploring. But there is a third viewpoint, held by men of
stature in the law, which recognizes that this tendency of juries is not
always a weakness but sometimes a great strength of the system. Lord
Coke is reported to have observed "the jurors are chancellors." 9
Holmes said:
[O]ne reason why I believe in our practice of leaving questions of
negligence to them is what is precisely one of their gravest defects
from the point of view of their theoretical function: that they will
introduce into their verdict a certain amount-a very large amount,
so far as I have observed-of popular prejudice, and thus keep the ad-
ministration of the law in accord with the wishes and feelings of the
community.140
Pound concluded that "jury lawlessness is the great corrective of law
in its actual administration." 141 One of our ablest trial judges of today
has noted that "traditionally juries are the device by which the rigor
of the law is modified pending the enactment of new statutes." 142
Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court believes that "we
would lose more than we would gain by a reform of fact-finding that
would only compel righteous adherence [by juries] to wrong rules."
Until the rules themselves are changed we are better off with "that
quiet distortion that presently adapts them to the needs of a rough
justice." 143
The implications of these differing points of view for the question
here under discussion were well summed up by James Bradley Thayer
over sixty years ago:
Logic and neatness of legal theory have always called loud, at least
in recent centuries, for special verdicts, so that the true significance
of ascertained facts might be ascertained and declared by the one
139. POUND, AN INTRODucrIoN TO THE PHILOSOP OF LAW 133 (1922).
140. HoLmES, COLLWMED LEGAL PAPERS 237-38 (1920).
141. Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 Am. L. REv. 12, 18 (1910).
142. Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1281,
1286 (1952).
143. Traynor, Fact Skepticism and the Judicial Process, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 635, 640
(1958).
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tribunal fitted to do this finally and with authority. But considerations
of policy have called louder for leaving to the jury a freer hand. 144
More recently, Moore concluded that the use of special verdicts or
the general verdict and interrogatories should be the exception and not
the rule, and that if there is sufficient evidence to circumvent a motion
for a directed verdict, "the problem is usually best solved by an overall,
common judgment of the jurors-the general verdict." 145
This last point of view has much to commend it. 14  If it is accepted
the administrative advantages, localizing error and facilitating instruc-
tions, to be had from interrogatories and special verdicts may well be
outweighed. It should be noted, however, that this view may not have
equal application at all times to all fields of the law. Recognition of the
need for the jury's equitable dispensing power in areas where the written
law is out of tune with popular notions of justice and is in transition
does not necessarily mean that the same need exists, or exists to the
same extent, in other areas. Moreover, the relative complexity of some
types of cases magnifies the importance for them of administrative
considerations which may not deserve great weight in the ordinary
traffic case.
144. THA"YER 218.
145.5 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACriCE 49.05, at 2218 (2d ed. 1951).
146. The writer is persuaded to this view, at least in the field of personal injury
accident litigation, until a more comprehensive solution is worked out. See James, Tort
Law in Midstream: Its Challenge to the Judicial Process, 8 BanFto L. Rav. 315 (1959).
